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Abstract: 
The support of containerization to trade development demands an efficient solution method for the 
container loading problem in order to reduce shipment and handling time. Hence, the stowage planning 
of containers is critical to providing speedy delivery of resources from the area of supply to the area of 
demand. Moreover, information on container terminal activities, structure of ship, and characteristics 
of containers is distributed among stowage planners. This information imposes constraints, and so the 
master bay plan problem (MBPP) becomes NP-hard. Therefore, a multi-agent systems (MAS) 
methodology is designed to effectively communicate the information and solve the MBPP sustainably. 
In the designed MAS methodology, an information exchange system (IES) is created for stowage 
planners to bid for ship slots in each experimental iterative combinatorial auction (ICA) market. The 
winner in the ICA experiments is provided with the ship slots, and the entire bay plan is prepared. 
Further, the ship-turnaround time is validated using the data obtained from the benchmark problem of 
Wilson and Roach (1999).  
Keywords: Master bay plan problem (MBPP), multi-agent system (MAS), information exchange 
system (IES), iterative combinatorial auction (ICA). 
1. Introduction 
Since the advent of standard containers, trade has increased severalfold as containerization has 
facilitated the intermodal transport of goods, short sea shipping, expansions in ship size, and 
competitiveness (Lun et al., 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to effectively manage the complex 
activities, such as loading, storing, and unloading processes, to reduce ship turnaround time, handling 
charges, and transit time along the container distribution system during certain and uncertain events and 
to improve the economic performance of liner shipping companies (Imai et al., 2006; Shi and Li, 2016). 
Hence, the effective arrangement of containers, that is, the stowing of containers in ships, is the key to 
achieving higher productivity and economic gain. Stowage planning involves the allocation of set C of 
Axyz containers of different types into a set SA of Li,j,k available locations within a container ship, 
considering structural and operational constraints related to both the containers and the ship, and 
minimizing the total stowage time or ship turnaround time (tL) (Ambrosino et al., 2004). Thus, 
generating an optimal stowage plan—considering the size, weight, destination, stability, and assignment 
constraints and the combinatorial nature of mapping ship slots to the containers—is critical for the 
success of liner shipping companies (De Queiroz and Miyazawa, 2013; Keceli, 2016).  
As container stowage planning involves several constraints, MBPP is NP-hard and so is solved by 
skilled personnel using heuristic procedures discussed by Woo et al. (2013) and Yun and Choi (1999). 
Also, the information regarding the stowage activities is scattered among stowage planners without an 
information exchange mechanism to solve MBPP (Huang et al., 2016). Moreover, the result obtained 
  
from the empirical model developed by Lu et al. (2016) pointed out that effective communication and 
collaboration among terminal users is the key to improving container terminal sustainability 
performance. Hence, the design of an effective information exchange system (IES) is crucial to making 
sustainable decisions in stowage planning (Partibaraj et al., 2015). UNCTAD (2013) also indicated that 
sustainable development depends on the linkages between economic, social, and environmental aspects 
in the decision support system. Further, the application of the complex adaptive system by Justice et al. 
(2016) provided scope for port managers (agents) to self-organize, assist in better managing ports, and 
achieve sustainability. In addition, the use of the multi-agent system (MAS) concept in container 
terminal management by Henesey et al. (2002) supported its application, and highlighted that auction 
as an information protocol among agents is important for its implementation. Therefore, an auction 
mechanism is used to successfully implement MAS methodology to the MBPP. 
As per the study of different types of auction by Kalagnanam and Parkes (2004), it is revealed that the 
auction mechanism faces issues on incentive compatibility among agents in disclosing the private 
information on allocation. The study also concluded that an efficient allocation rule to maximize the 
total utility of agents and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payment rule to handle the incentive 
compatibility problem are vital. In the VCG payment rule, the incentive compatibility problem is solved 
by promoting the truth, revealed as a dominant bidding strategy for agents in an auction. It avoids the 
incentive for bidders in the auction to lie about the valuation of resources. Also, the externality placed 
on the other agents in the system by the reported preferences of the winning agent in the auction is 
calculated as the VCG payment to promote truthful bidding. An example of calculating the VCG 
payment is presented in Appendix 1. To further ease the computational and communicational difficulty 
in the VCG mechanism, an iterative variant of the VCG combinatorial auction designed by Debasis 
(2011) is used to allocate the combination of identical goods (containers). In general, iterative auction 
starts from zero and continues based on the bids submitted by agents to reflect its interest in ship slots, 
until exactly one agent is interested at the competitive equilibrium (CE) price of the auction market. 
The universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) means the equilibrium price that satisfies the property so 
that if any one agent is removed from the current auction market, the equilibrium price remains the 
same for the new version of the current auction market. Thus, the paper develops a multi-agent system 
(MAS) approach with ICA and VCG payment rules to assist stowage planners in communicating with 
IES, and solves the MBPP sustainably. A software program is developed to completely enumerate the 
bids submitted by agents to the ICA with the VCG payment rule to solve the MBPP and implement 
MAS methodology. 
In the designed MAS methodology, the operators involved in stowage planning are formed as agents to 
communicate with the IES by bidding based on the redemption value set by the auctioneer (ship captain) 
for each set of bundled slots. In turn, the IES forms market experiments to solve the MBPP using ICA. 
The experimental market design considers the agents with zero intelligence on bidding in the ICA 
  
mechanism, competitive equilibrium pricing, allocation policy, and continuous clearing policy of the 
auction market after every allocation at CE price. Zero-intelligence agents are agents who do not seek 
to maximize profit and do not observe, remember, or learn. A set of experiments with the above market 
policy is conducted to allocate each set of bundled slots. The desired allocation in an experiment is 
chosen by the experimenter (IES) among each set of experiments. The results are obtained and 
consolidated to prepare the master bay plan. Finally, the container total stowage time for the master bay 
plan is calculated and validated with the instances of the benchmark problem by Wilson and Roach 
(1999). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews past relevant studies, Section 3 describes 
the MBPP, Section 4 explains the design of the MAS model and its methodology, Section 5 provides 
the numerical evaluation of the MAS model, Section 6 presents the results and compares the solutions 
using the benchmark problem, and Section 7 summarizes our study with future scope. 
2. Literature review 
The research contributions related to the master bay plan problem, the extent usage of MAS, and the 
development of auction mechanisms discussed in the literature to automate stowage planning processes 
are reviewed in this section. A few attempts to model the MBPP are as follows. The earliest attempt by 
Botter and Brinati (1992) was to develop a mathematical model, and they explained the computational 
complexities in determining an optimal solution at a reasonable processing time. Subsequently, to 
minimize the total stowage time, Ambrosino et al. (2004) explained the MBPP settings and proposed a 
0-1 linear programming model with sophisticated pre-processing and pre-stowing heuristics. 
Furthermore, Ambrosino et al. (2006) proposed a local search exchange algorithm for removing 
solution infeasibilities to reduce the total stowage time by partitioning ship space using a branch and 
bound algorithm and allotted containers to each ship partition using a 0-1 linear programming model. 
In terms of considering other factors, Imai et al. (2006) formulated a multi-objective simultaneous 
stowage planning model considering ship stability, list, trim, and container re-handle, and reported that 
the computation time to obtain a set of non-inferior solutions is huge. The difficulty of solving the NP-
hard combinatorial master bay plan problem was explained by Sciomachen and Tanfani (2007) using 
three-dimensional bin packing heuristics. In terms of solution techniques, Dubrovsky et al. (2002) 
developed a compact encoding technique to reduce the solution search space using a genetic algorithm 
and constructed a stowage plan for ships with a capacity up to 1,000 TEUs. Wilson and Roach (1999) 
applied local search algorithms and techniques based on combinatorial optimization for solving the 
container stowage process in two phases, i) a strategic phase to assign generalized containers to bays, 
and ii) a tactical planning phase to assign specific locations in a block to specific containers. Previous 
studies on modeling and solution techniques show that different attempts have been made in developing 
suitable automated solution techniques to the stowage planning process. However, full automation of 
  
the stowage planning process is not yet addressed, hence, the assistance of the full-fledged decision 
support system to automate the stowage activities is essential. 
A few automated decision support solutions are reviewed in this section. Douma et al. (2012) designed 
a simulation game for implementing a multi-agent system among independent and competitive actors 
in barge handling and terminal operations. The game supports its implementation with challenges to 
design a game in unstable network connections. The importance of sharing critical information and 
incentives for parties to accept performance-based pricing mechanisms is discussed in the recent studies 
(Lam and Zhang, 2014; Lam and Yip, 2008; Arul et al., 2006). Recent studies also showed that a well-
organized administration, a sound financial system, and competitive policies considering the effect of 
information exchange on coalition models could promote sustainability (Marlow and Nair, 2006; Wang 
et al., 2016). Sinha-Ray et al. (2003) proposed MAS application to achieve sustainability in international 
trade, container distribution, and inland distribution systems. Parsons and Wooldridge (2002) presented 
the interactions between MAS and game theory, with scope on designing efficient algorithms to handle 
the computational complexities. The application of game theory for MAS provides optimal solutions, 
but also provides negativities due to its design. However, the suggestion by Henesey et al. (2002) to 
design multi-agent architecture for allocating terminal resources and to develop an auction protocol for 
MAS implementation turned our interest to the review of auction mechanism design. Kalagnanam and 
Parkes (2004) presented the desired economic properties and the computational complexities in auction 
mechanism design. Debasis (2011) surveyed the optimal and economically efficient auction designs 
and described a particular iterative combinatorial auction that implements the VCG mechanism. 
Furuhata et al. (2009) presented an experimental approach to design and evaluate the market 
mechanisms with different sets of market policies. Similarly, the potential use of agent-based systems 
for logistics applications was highlighted in a recent review article by Min (2010). Hence, it is evident 
from the review that an integrated multi-agent system with an auction mechanism to solve MBPP has 
not been addressed so far, and it is a major gap that this study attempts to solve. Based on the review, 
it is obvious that MAS with an auction mechanism could be a potential solution approach to MBPP. 
Hence, the work attempts to design MAS and develop a software program with complete enumerative 
search algorithm of ICA to implement the MAS. 
3. Description of the master bay plan problem 
This section presents the objective criteria, the structural constraints of a container ship, containers, and 
their operational constraints in MBPP with its solution difficulties and assumptions. 
3.1. Objective criteria 
The objectives of this study are: 
 To minimize the ship turn-around time at the container terminal. 
 To design an IES for agents to share information regarding constraints in stowage planning. 
 To assist the agents in actively participating in stowage planning by presenting its interest in 
  
the form of bids to IES. 
 To make sustainable decisions by efficient allocation of slots to agents involved in stowage 
planning activities. 
3.2. Structural constraints of a container ship 
The ship has specifications related to the structure, size of lower and upper decks, and type of the 
container ships. To understand its general arrangement and outline plan, the Lo-Lo (Lift on–Lift off) 
container ship that loads and unloads containers from the top using quay cranes (QC = 1 to nq) at 
transfer time (TTH, QC) for movement between hatches (H = 1 to h) is considered, as shown in Figure 
1. It exposes the structure and the available locations of cell with an 8-foot height, 8-foot width, and 20-
foot length by using three two-digit indices. These indices generally represent: 
 Bay (i = 1 to B), which gives its position relative to the cross-section of the ship (counted from 
bow to stern), where each 20-foot bay is numbered with an odd number, i.e., bay 01, 03, 05, 
etc., and two contiguous odd bays as one even bay for the stowage of 40-foot containers, i.e., 
bay 04 = bay 03 + bay 05. The bays are either above deck or below deck (enclosed within the 
ship beneath removable hatch-lids) and are grouped together using the associated hatch number. 
 Row (j = 1 to R), which gives its position relative to the vertical section of the corresponding 
bay (counted from the center to the outside) ship locations represented by an even number if 
they are located on the seaside, i.e., row 02, 04, 06, and an odd number if they are located on 
the yard side, i.e., row 01, 03, 05, etc. 
 Tier (k = 1 to T), which gives its position related to the horizontal section of the corresponding 
bay (counted from the bottom to the top) of the ship, that is, the levels are numbered from the 
bottom of the hold to the top with an even number, i.e., tier 02, 04, 06, etc., while in the upper 
deck, possible numbers are 82, 84, and 86. However the address numbers denoted for each ship 
location depend on the system adopted by the maritime company. 
3.3. Container and its related constraints 
The containers conforming to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards are 
considered, and their dimensions are: 
 Size of a container (z). Standard sizes of a container are 20 and 40 feet in length with a cross-
section of 8 feet by 8 feet, expressed in terms of TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units). A 40-
foot container is equivalent to two 20-foot containers and it restricts stowing a 40-foot bay if 
the corresponding two 20-foot slots are occupied. 
 Type of container (x). Standard 20- and 40-feet containers (x = T, F) are stowed depending on 
size; however, the reefer (x = Rf) and hazardous (x = Hz) containers posses the exact location 
defined by the ship coordinator according to the provisions on the ship. 
 Weight of container (Wy). The standard weight of an empty container (y = E) ranges from 2 to 
3.5 tons, while the maximum weight of a full container (y = FL) to be stowed in a container 
  
ship ranges from 20 to 32 tons for 20-foot and 30 to 48 tons for 40-foot containers, respectively. 
This load variation of full load, less than full load (y = LFL), and empty containers restricts the 
stowage concerning ship stability. 
3.4. Operational constraints 
 The parameters considered in balancing the uneven distribution of load and stability of the ship are:  
 Trim that reflects the angle of the vessel fore to aft must be close to zero or a desired value 
based on shipping line requirement. 
 Heel that measures the inclination from the vertical towards port or starboard of the ship must 
be close to zero or a desired value based on shipping line requirement. 
 Bending moment due to the forces acting from bow to stern must be close to zero or a desired 
value based on shipping line requirement. 
 Torsion due to the forces acting from port to starboard produced by unevenly distributed cargo 
weight can weaken the physical structure of the ship. 
 Over-stows due to the unloading of containers that block access to others must be avoided. 
 Rehandle to move the containers and allow access to the unloading containers must be avoided.  
The total weight of all containers cannot exceed the maximum ship capacity (Q). The weight of a stack 
in a tier with three 20-foot and 40-foot containers cannot be greater than the a priori established value 
provided by the shipping line. The weight of a container located in a tier cannot be greater than the 
weight of the container located in a lower tier having the same row and bay. 
In addition, the stowage practices followed in the container terminal impose constraints for the speedy 
handling of containers using the allotted number of cranes, which impose additional constraints on 
hatch, block, and tier allocation of the ship to the containers. They are: 
 Container arrangement in hatches: The bay partitioning practices followed according to the 
container destination are for the containers belonging to the first destination along the ship 
route. The priorities in bay allocation are B/2, B/2+3, B/2-3, B/2+4, B/2-4, B/2+5, and so on, 
and for next destination the priorities are B/2+1, B/2-1, etc., and continued for all bays and 
container destinations.  
 Container arrangements in block: The rules for arranging containers in blocks are for the 
arrangement in central blocks to stack upwards from stern to bow and from the center toward 
the end; for starboard blocks, the sequence is to stack upward, stern to bow, and left to right; 
and for the port side, the sequence is to stack upward, stern to bow, and right to left.  
 Container arrangement in tier: The stowing condition in tiers is to load first in lower tiers the 
containers having final destination of the ship and load last the containers to be unloaded first. 
 Distribution of container: The equilibrium conditions required for safe transport are cross-
equilibrium, that is, the weight on the right side of the ship, including the odd rows of the hold 
to carry heavy containers and upper deck, must be equal or within a given tolerance to the 
  
weight on the left side of the ship, including the even rows of the hold and upper deck; 
horizontal equilibrium, that is, the weight on the stern must be equal or within a given tolerance 
to the weight on the bow; and vertical equilibrium, that is, the weight on each tier must be 
greater or equal than the weight on the tier immediately over it. 
 Crane intensity: The safety distance that is two to six bay lengths between two adjacent 
operating cranes must be maintained because of the physical size of quay cranes. 
These constraints make the MBPP problem difficult to solve due to the reasons presented in following 
section 3.5. 
3.5. Problem size and difficulties 
The container loading problem is combinatorial explosive with the number of possible stowage 
configurations; say, for a medium-sized container ship of 2,000 TEU, it is approximately 3.3 x 105735. 
Even for the smallest vessel sizes, container stowage planning is a large-scale problem due to the large 
number of variables. The characteristics prevailing in the maritime logistics on the stowage planning of 
containers imposes additional constraints on achieving reduced turnaround time. Thus, the problem has 
been described as being NP-hard by Botter and Brinanti (1992), who concluded that it is not possible 
to guarantee an optimal solution for commercial-sized ships in a reasonable processing time. Hence, the 
efficient ICA mechanism for MAS model is designed for agents involved in MBPP with the following 
assumptions. 
3.6. Assumptions 
 The interaction between the agents and ship coordinator is allowed only through IES. 
 The demand for ship slots is assumed to be lesser than or equal to the number of available ship 
slot locations. 
 The shipment demand (D) is bundled for combinatorial auction as follows: n steps are assumed 
and containers with D/n size are formed in each stage, m identical bundles of size n/m 
containers are assumed, and 2m bundle sets (BS) are made to obtain bid requests from bidders 
in ICA. 
 A 20-foot container is assumed as one TEU, and a 40-foot container as two TEUs. 
 The ship turnaround time is considered equal to stowage time. 
 The cycle port rotation for the ship is considered. 
 Ballast control to maintain the stability of the ship is assumed to be set by the user and is 
neglected in the stowage planning process. 
 Bids are assumed to be randomly generated from the uniform distribution by zero-intelligence 
agents in each experimental auction market created by IES. 
 Agents in experiments are assumed to redeem all the bundles allocated to them at the end of 
each experiment. 
  
 
Figure 1: General arrangement, outline plan, and block formation for the Lo-Lo containership 
4. Decision support system 
The procedure to solve the MBPP using the MAS model and ICA mechanism are discussed in this 
section. 
4.1. Design of MAS model 
The MAS design phase consists of three stages to allocate containers in hatches, blocks, and tiers. The 
information implicit with agents and information exchange system (IES) in each of the stages is 
presented as follows: 
4.1.1. Stage 1 – Hatch allocation to cranes 
At this stage, the hatches are allocated by IES based on the output of the experiment conducted, using 
the redemption value of the hatch bundles formed from available hatch capacity. The redemption values 
are set by the ship captain to implicitly inform the ship’s stability condition and its structural restrictions. 
The IES runs experiments in the market designed with ICA mechanism and provides an information 
exchange mode to crane agents. Based on the information from IES, the crane agents submit the 
preferences in the form of bids and demand hatches. The bidding criteria considered by crane agents 
are a) container shipment demand, type, and destination; b) available hatch capacity; c) crane 
accessibility to hatches; and d) order of bay allocation to avoid bow–stern imbalances. The interactive 
structure of crane agents with IES is shown in Figure 2. 
  
 
Figure 2: Interaction of crane agents with IES 
4.1.2. Stage 2 – Block allocation 
The shipment demand allotted in Stage 1 to hatches are divided based on its location into port side (PS) 
blocks, port side inter-hatch (PSIH) blocks, central blocks (CB), starboard side inter-hatch (SSIH) 
blocks, and starboard side (SS) blocks to allocate slots considering the horizontal stability of the ship. 
The IES interacts with ship captain and presents redemption value of bundled shipment demand to block 
agents considering the ship stability and structural restrictions. The block agents in turn submit bids, 
considering the ship horizontal stability, based on the redemption value provided by IES to match the 
container characteristics with ship structure. The experiments are run by IES based on the bid values 
and the blocks are allocated to the bundle of containers. This interactive structure of block agents with 
IES is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Interactive structure of block agents with IES 
4.1.3. Stage 3 – Tier allocation 
In this stage, the container location with tier conflicts, that is, placing containers in top or bottom slots, 
are identified from Stage 2 and are reallocated to provide vertical balancing and avoid rehandling. Here, 
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the containers, based on destination and type, are represented as tier agents to interact with the ship 
captain to confine to the ship characteristics through IES. Experiments are then conducted by IES based 
on the redemption value set by the ship captain defining ship properties and the bid values submitted 
by the tier agents. The interactive structure of the tier agents with IES is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Interactive structure of Tier agents with IES 
4.2. Experimental market design for bidding agents with IES 
This section presents the design and implementation of market mechanism experimentally based on 
ICA. In ICA, the bid values are received from the agents and the evaluation is done based on the 
complete enumerative logical search algorithm discussed in Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2. A formal 
market model with continuous clearing and competitive equilibrium pricing policies among zero-
intelligence agents is considered, and the experiments are conducted to match the demand and supply 
of ship slots. Therefore, agents are allowed to generate random bids uniformly distributed over the range 
of values chosen from the redemption values. In the experiments, uniformly distributed random values 
are generated using Microsoft Excel function Randbetween (bottom, top) by the bidders (agents) and 
submitted to IES as a bid for a bundle of resources. The experimenter (IES) uses these randomly 
submitted bid values in each experiment and chooses a suitable output for an experiment. 
4.3. Solution procedure for MAS with ICA in experimental markets 
The steps followed to prepare a stowage plan using the MAS approach are: 
Step 1: Input the ship route, container shipment demand among ports, container and ship characteristics, 
crane availability, crane location, crane accessibility to hatches, crane movement time between hatches, 
and crane loading time to slot locations. 
Step 2: Allocation of hatch to cranes: 
 2.1. Sort the containers for shipment based on its destination and type. 
2.2. Divide the shipment demand based on the hatch capacity as per the bundling assumptions, 
and outline the auction rounds for the allocation of hatches to crane agents. 
2.3. Initiate the experiment (ne) among the crane agents by providing the redemption value to 
the bidders for each step (st) in the auction round (ar). 
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2.4. Collect the bid that considers cross-equilibrium of the ship and minimum crane movement 
time from the crane agents. 
2.5. Run the ICA mechanism and determine the winner of the hatch, VCG payment, universal 
competitive equilibrium price, and market revenue for the experimenter among Ne experiments. 
The profit earned by the crane agents is calculated from the suitable output among Ne 
experiments using the relation: 
 Profit earned by crane agent = redemption value for the corresponding hatch set by the ship 
captain – VCG payment made by the crane agent. 
2.6. Repeat all steps (ST) and auction rounds (AR), and determine the total crane movement 
time and total profit earned by the crane agents. 
Step 3: Allocation of containers to blocks in hatches: 
3.1. The hatch allocations are divided into blocks—port side, port side inter-hatch, central 
blocks, starboard side inter-hatch, and starboard side blocks—and their capacity is noted. 
3.2. The blocks are represented as agents and allowed to bid based on the redemption value set 
by the experimenter for bundled slots allotted to hatches. 
3.3. Run an experiment (ne) and ICA mechanism to determine the winner block agent, VCG 
payment, universal competitive  equilibrium price, and market revenue for the experimenter 
among Ne experiments. The profit earned by the block agents is calculated from the suitable 
output among Ne experiments by using the relation: 
Profit earned by crane agent = redemption value for the  corresponding block set by the ship 
captain – VCG payment made by the block agent. 
3.4. Repeat it to all hatches and determine the total profit earned by the block agents. 
Step 4: Allocation of containers to tier in blocks for vertical equilibrium: 
4.1. The containers with conflicts on vertical balancing are formed into top and bottom slots. 
4.2. Conflict slots are bundled for top and bottom tier agents, and the redemption value is set 
by the experimenter to initiate the ICA mechanism. 
4.3. Bids are collected from top and bottom agents to obtain the vertical equilibrium for each 
block. 
4.4. Run an experiment (ne) and an ICA mechanism to determine the winner of the blocks, VCG 
payment, universal competitive equilibrium price, and market revenue for the experimenter 
among Ne experiments. The profit earned by the tier agents is calculated from the suitable output 
among Ne experiments using the relation: 
 Profit earned by tier agent = redemption value for the corresponding tier set by the ship captain 
– VCG payment made by the tier agent. 
4.5. Repeat it to all blocks that have conflict in tier allocation and vertical equilibrium. 
4.6. Calculate the total profit for the top and bottom agents. 
  
Step 5: The bay plan is prepared from the allocations, and the slot loading time for each bay is 
determined. 
Step 6: The total loading time for the ship at the origin port and the total profit for agents involved in 
stowage planning are calculated, and the order of allocating the hatches is presented. 
The flowchart for solving the MBPP and preparing a bay plan with minimum loading time is shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Solution procedure for MBPP 
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The solution procedure of the software program developed for ICA to implement the MAS is explained 
as follows. 
4.3.1. Complete enumerative logical search algorithm 
IES uses the complete enumerative logical search algorithm to determine the VCG payment, agent 
profit, competitive equilibrium price, and slot allocation in ICA mechanism. The steps are: 
Step 1: The agents (NB) are allowed to bid (BV(NB,BS)) bundled sets of the IES. 
Step 2: Iteration count in the auction is set from 0 to large value. 
Step 3: If iteration value is zero, set the auction value of all buyers and bundle sets (AV(NB,BS)) as zero, 
run winner determination algorithm, including all buyers using its bid value in Step 1, and determine 
an initial allocation (AL(NB,BS)). 
Step 4: Update the array of agents (bidders) with one if allocated and zero if the agents are not allocated. 
Step 5: The auction values are incremented for each agent without allocation in the previous iteration 
if: 
Step 5.1: The bid value is not equal to zero, and 
Step 5.2: The bundle set that has maximum bid value for each agent, and 
Step 5.3: The auction value of the bundle set with a maximum bid value is equal to the bid 
value of any other bundled set of the same agent, and 
Step 5.4: The auction value is less than the bid value for the corresponding bid set. 
Step 6: Run winner determination algorithm with all agents, and by excluding one agent for (NB + 1) 
times, calculate the revenue of IES in (NB + 1) markets by adding the auction values for the allocated 
bundle sets and go to Step 4, else: 
Step 7: If auction value is equal to bid value for any agent and for any bundle sets, run the winner 
determination algorithm with all agents and exclude one agent for (NB + 1) times, and calculate the 
revenue of IES (NB + 1) markets by adding the auction values for the allocated bundle sets. 
Step 8: Store the allocation as final allocation (AL(NB,BS)) of bundle sets to the agents. 
Step 9: Calculate the maximum auction value (competitive equilibrium price) considering all agents in 
the market, and store the bundle set and agent containing the maximum auction value. 
Step 10: Increment the auction value if: 
Step 10.1: The agent to be incremented is not the agent containing the maximum auction value. 
Step 10.2: The maximum bid value of the agent for the bundle sets is greater than the maximum 
auction value from Step 9. 
Step 10.3: Run winner determination algorithm with all agents and by excluding one agent for 
(NB + 1) times. 
  
Step 11: Calculate the IES revenue for the final allocation as in Step 8 using the auction value in Step 
10 for (NB + 1) markets. 
Step 12: Else, if: 
Step 12.1: The agent is not the agent with the maximum auction value found in Step 9, and  
Step 12.2: The auction value of any other agent is equal to the maximum auction value as in 
Step 9. 
Step 13: Run winner determination algorithm with all agents and exclude one agent for (NB + 1) times. 
Step 14: Calculate the IES revenue for the final allocation in Step 8 using the auction value in Step 12 
for (NB + 1) market at the Universal Competitive Equilibrium (UCE) price, stop iteration. 
Step 15: Calculate agent’s VCG payment using the equation: 
Buyer’s VCG Payment = {(Sum of auction value of allocated set of slots to the agent) – [(IES revenue 
in market of all agents (SRNB)) – (IES revenue in market without the agent to whom the payment is 
calculated (SRNB-nb))]} 
Step16: Output the final allocation in all markets, VCG payments of all agents. 
The function used in the software program to determine the winner in each auction round is presented 
in the next section.  
4.3.2 Winner determination algorithm 
The algorithm to determine the winner of the bundles in each increment of an ICA experiment is given 
below. 
Step 1: Input number of bundles (m), number of agents (NB). 
Step 2: Calculate the BS = 2m number of combinations, with each combination that contains the set of 
bundles. 
Step 3: Obtain auction value for all the bundles set from the ICA loop for each winner determination 
algorithm execution. 
Step 4: Calculate the summation of auction value for 2(BS)*(NB) allocations checking for the non-repetition 
of bundles and sets.  
Step 5: Count the number of winners in each allocation. 
Step 6: Choose the allocation with maximum auction value summations and the number of winners. 
The output of the complete enumerative search algorithm is used by the experimenter in evaluating the 
experimental market design for solving the MBPP and loading time for the ship at the origin port. The 
total profit for agents involved in stowage planning is calculated, and the order of allocating the hatches 
  
is also determined. The above solution procedure is illustrated using the data from the benchmark 
problem in the section 5. 
5. Numerical evaluation 
This section presents the numerical evaluation of the market with a MAS model and an ICA mechanism 
to prepare the stowage plan. The ship is considered with port rotation as shown in Figure 6 and container 
loading at origin port (Busan) considering the stowage constraints discussed in the section. 
5.1. Input details for illustrative work 
The details of container characteristics, ship characteristics, and loading time for crane to slots in each 
hatch obtained from the bench mark problem (Wilson and Roach, 1999) are presented below. 
 
Figure 6: The cyclic ship route considered for illustration 
5.1.1. Container characteristics 
The shipment demand of two different types of containers to ports along the ship itinerary is given in 
Table 1. In the illustration, the stowage of nonstandard dimensions containers, hazardous containers, 
and reefer containers are not considered to concisely explain the adapted solution methodology. 
Table 1: Container characteristics 
Destination port Port number Type in foot length Total demand in TEU 
Osaka 1 
20 217 
40 48 
Keelung 2 
20 185 
40 34 
Kaohsung 3 
20 94 
40 110 
Total 688 
 
5.1.2 Ship characteristics 
The nine-hatch, 688 TEU capacity container ship is used to test the methodology. The ship’s structural 
restrictions to stow containers are: a) all above-deck bays can have any length of container stowed; b) 
under-deck hatches 1 and 8 can have 40-foot and 20-foot containers stowed; c) under-deck hatches 2 
and 7 can only have 20-foot containers stowed; and d) under-deck hatches 3, 4, 5, and 6 can only have 
40-foot containers stowed. The details presenting the number of bays, rows, and tiers available for 
stowage planning in the ship is given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Ship structural details 
Number of 
hatches 
Number of 
bays 
Number 
of rows 
Number of tiers Total 
capacity 
(TEU) Below deck Above deck 
9 35 6 to 8 2 to 6 2 or 3 688 
Busan Osaka Keelung Kaohsiung Busan
  
5.1.3 Crane accessibility and loading time to ship slots 
Based on the ship structure, quay cranes will be operated and positioned with successive cranes placed 
after two bay lengths. Therefore, it is assumed three quay cranes are used and positioned near hatches 
1, 4, and 7. The possibility of crane arrangement without collision among crane operations is shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Crane accessibility 
Crane number 1 2 3 
Accessibility Hatch 1, 2, 3 Hatch 4, 5, 6 Hatch 7, 8, 9 
 
As each crane hook acquires time to be transferred to its accessible bays, the time to position it for 
loading is assumed and presented in Table 4. It assists the crane agents in bidding suitably and 
minimizing the crane movement time to hatches. 
Table 4: Crane positioning time to hatches 
Crane location Crane number 
Hatch number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
At hatch 1 1 0’ 45’' 65” - - - - - - 
At hatch 4 2 - - - 0’ 45’' 65” - - - 
At hatch 7 3 - - - - - - 0’ 45’' 65” 
 
The loading times with respect to each tier and row of the containership are also assumed and presented 
in Table 5.  
Table 5: Loading time for crane to slots in each hatch in hours: minutes: seconds 
  Row 08 Row 06 Row 04 Row 02 Row 01 Row 03 Row 05 Row 07 
Tier 86 0:00:34 0:00:32 0:00:31 0:00:29 0:00:28 0:00:29 0:00:31 0:00:32 
Tier 84 0:00:35 0:00:34 0:00:32 0:00:31 0:00:29 0:00:31 0:00:32 0:00:34 
Tier 82 0:00:38 0:00:36 0:00:35 0:00:33 0:00:32 0:00:33 0:00:35 0:00:36 
Tier 12 0:00:37 0:00:35 0:00:34 0:00:32 0:00:31 0:00:32 0:00:34 0:00:35 
Tier 10 0:00:38 0:00:37 0:00:35 0:00:34 0:00:32 0:00:34 0:00:35 0:00:37 
Tier 08 0:00:40 0:00:38 0:00:37 0:00:35 0:00:34 0:00:35 0:00:37 0:00:38 
Tier 06 0:00:42 0:00:40 0:00:38 0:00:37 0:00:35 0:00:37 0:00:38 0:00:40 
Tier 04 0:00:43 0:00:42 0:00:40 0:00:38 0:00:37 0:00:38 0:00:40 0:00:42 
Tier 02 0:00:44 0:00:43 0:00:41 0:00:39 0:00:38 0:00:39 0:00:41 0:00:43 
 
5.2. Stowage steps to allocate slots 
The details presented in Section 5.1 are used as follows to solve MBPP using MAS methodology. 
5.2.1. Stage 1 – Hatch allocation to cranes 
Based on the container type and destination, the number of rounds to allocate the containers to ship slot 
is determined. For each container type in a destination, an allocation round is formed. Then the container 
  
shipment to each destination is split into steps based on the capacity in each bay. The details of 
allocation are provided in Table 6. 
Table 6: Allocation round, steps based on bay capacity, slot demand, and container 
characteristics 
Round 
No(AR) 
Number of 
steps(ST) 
Allocation (TEU) Total 
demand 
(TEU) 
Destination 
Container 
type 
(20’ or 40’) Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
1 5 48 48 48 48 25 217 
1 
20 
2 1 48 - - - - 48 40 
3 4 48 48 48 41 - 185 
2 
20 
4 1 34 - - - - 34 40 
5 2 48 46 - - - 94 
3 
20 
6 3 48 48 14 - - 110 40 
 
In each step, a set of “Ne” experiments are run by the experimenter in IES and the desired hatch 
allocation to the crane is made by the experimenter. The redemption value provided by the experimenter 
for each bundle of shipment demands and the randomly generated bid value for the crane agents for the 
desired output for all steps and rounds to initiate the ICA mechanism are presented in Appendix 2. 
The hatch allocation, choice of the hatch, CE price, VCG payment to the crane agents, revenue to the 
experimenter in conducting the experiment, and profit of each crane agent are calculated and presented 
in Table 7. 
Table 7: Hatch allocation with VCG payment and profit earned by crane agents in auction steps 
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The allocation to the agents is done at CE price, and the VCG payments and revenue of the experiment 
are calculated at the universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price that does not change due to changes 
in the market economy. Thus the general arrangement of containers in hatches is obtained. Based on 
the hatch allocation to the cranes, the crane handling time is calculated. The order of hatch allocation is 
prepared based on container destination, priority in loading, and deck allocation. The container 
destination is represented by port number (1, 2, 3); the priority is represented by numbers from 1 to 6, 
i.e., above and below the deck allocation by number 1 and 2 respectively. Thus, the order of allocation 
  
(111) represents the container with destination port 1, priority of hatch allocation 1, and deck allocation 
1. The crane allocation and its transfer time between hatches are obtained and presented in Table 8.  
Table 8: Crane movement time for hatch allocation 
Allocation 
(TEU) 
Hatch 
no. 
Destination 
Container 
type 
Deck 
allocation 
Order of 
allocation 
Crane 
number 
Crane 
movement 
(Crane 
number, from - 
to hatches) 
Move 
time 
(sec) 
48 5 1 40 UD 111 2 2,4-5 45 
48 5 1 20 AD 112 2 - - 
48 6 1 20 AD 122 2 2,5-6 20 
32 4 1 20 AD 132 2 2,6-4 65 
16 4 1 20 AD 132 2 - - 
16 7 1 20 AD 142 3 3,7-7 0 
32 7 1 20 AD 142 3 - - 
25 8 1 20 AD 152 3 3,7-8 45 
34 6 2 40 UD 211 2 2,4-6 65 
48 7 2 20 UD 221 3 3,8-7 45 
16 8 2 20 UD 231 3 3,7-8 45 
15 8 2 20 UD 231 3 - - 
26 2 2 20 UD 241 1 1,1-2 45 
32 2 2 20 AD 242 1 - - 
48 3 2 20 AD 242 1 1,2-3 20 
48 3 3 40 UD 311 1 - - 
16 8 3 20 
AD and 
UD 
321 3 3,8-8 0 
24 1 3 20 AD 332 1 1,3-1 65 
24 9 3 20 AD 342 3 3,8-9 20 
14 6 3 40 UD 351 2 2,6-6 0 
24 1 3 20 UD 361 1 1,1-1 0 
6 2 3 20 UD 361 1 1,1-1 0 
48 4 3 40 UD 361 2 2,6-4 65 
 Total crane movement time 
(hours:minutes:seconds) 
0:09:05 
 
The overall profit for each crane agents after Stage 1 – hatch allocation is determined and presented in 
Table 9. To further control the lateral stability and operational constraints, the hatches are divided into 
blocks as illustrated in section 5.2.2 and allocated. 
 
Table 9: Total profit earned by the crane agents 
Crane agent Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 
Profit (Rs) 92 65 53 
 
5.2.2 Stage 2 – Block allocation to hatches 
In this stage, the possible ways to divide the allocated slots into blocks in terms of its size and capacity 
(TEU – twenty-foot equivalent unit) is analyzed as per the constraints discussed in Section 4.3 and 
presented in Table 10 for each hatch and its corresponding bays. 
 
 
Table 10: Block categorization based on bay capacity in hatches 
  
Hatch 
no. 
Hatch 
capacity 
(TEU) 
Block 
position 
(above deck/ 
below deck) 
Bay type 
considered 
(odd/even) 
Bay 
number 
Slot size 
in feet 
Number 
of blocks 
for a bay 
Block 
category 
Block 
size 
Total 
TEU 
for a bay 
1 48 
AD 
Odd bay 01,03 20’ 2 
PS 6 6 
SS 6 6 
Even bay 2 40’ 2 
PS 6 12 
SS 6 12 
UD 
Odd bay 01,03 20’ 2 
PS 6 6 
SS 6 6 
Even bay 2 40’ 2 
PS 6 12 
SS 6 12 
2 64 
AD 
Odd bay 05,07 20’ 2 
PS 8 8 
SS 8 8 
Even bay 6 40’ 2 
PS 8 16 
SS 8 16 
UD Odd bay 05,07 20’ 2 
PS 8 8 
SS 8 8 
3 to 6 384 
AD 
Odd bay 
9,11,13,15
,17,19,21,
23 
20’ 5 
PS 6 6 
CB 6 6 
SS 6 6 
PSIH 3 3 
SSIH 3 3 
Even Bay 
10,14,18,2
2 
40’ 5 
PS 6 12 
CB 6 12 
SS 6 12 
PSIH 3 6 
SSIH 3 6 
UD Even bay 
10,14,18,2
2 
40’ 3 
PS 5 10 
CB 14 28 
SS 5 10 
7 96 
AD 
Odd bay 25,27 20’ 5 
PS 6 6 
CB 6 6 
SS 6 6 
PSIH 3 3 
SSIH 3 3 
Even bay 26 40’ 5 
PS 6 12 
CB 6 12 
SS 6 12 
PSIH 3 6 
SSIH 3 6 
UD Odd bay 25,27 20’ 3 
PS 5 5 
CB 14 14 
SS 5 5 
8 72 
AD 
Odd bay 29,31 20’ 2 
PS 8 8 
SS 8 8 
Even bay 30 40’ 2 
PS 8 16 
SS 8 16 
UD 
Odd bay 29,31 20’ 2 
PS 10 10 
SS 10 10 
Even bay 30 40’ 2 
PS 10 20 
SS 10 20 
9 24 AD 
Odd bay 33, 35 20’ 2 
PS 6 6 
SS 6 6 
Even bay 34 40’ 2 
PS 6 12 
SS 6 12 
 
 
 
Similar to Stage 1, block agents are formed, redemption values are received by the experimenter (IES), 
bid values are randomly generated for each experiment, “Ne” experiments are run, and the desired 
  
output of an experimenter is selected. The redemption value set by theexperimenter and bid value of 
agents for block allocation is presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Redemption value set by experimenter and bid value of agents for block allocation 
Hatch 
Agent Redemption value of experimenter (Rs) Bid values from the agent in experiment (Rs) 
Bundle 
sets 
{1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123} {1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123} 
1 
PS 6 6 - 8 - - - 3 6 - 9 - - - 
SS 9 12 - 15 - - - 9 9 - 9 - - - 
1 
PS 9 10 - 13 - - - 3 4 - 4 - - - 
SS 7 10 - 11 - - - 3 3 - 4 - - - 
2 
PS 10 11 - 13 - - - 5 4 - 5 - - - 
SS 5 6 - 11 - - - 4 4 - 5 - - - 
2 
PS 7 9 - 12 - - - 8 7 - 8 - - - 
SS 5 8 - 11 - - - 6 7 - 8 - - - 
3 
PS 5 9 10 15 18 18 19 3 4 4 6 6 6 7 
CB 7 8 12 15 15 16 19 4 3 3 6 6 6 7 
SS 8 9 9 11 14 16 18 4 4 3 6 6 6 7 
PSIH 6 7 - 10 - - - 2 3 - 3 - - - 
SSIH 5 5 - 9 - - - 2 2 - 3 - - - 
3 
PS 5 6 6 9 9 12 13 3 4 3 7 6 7 8 
PSIH - - - - - - - 2 3 - 3 - - - 
CB 5 5 7 8 10 12 20 4 3 3 6 7 7 8 
SSIH - - - - - - - 2 2 - 3 - - - 
SS 5 8 9 10 11 13 16 3 4 3 7 6 7 8 
4 
PS 5 11 12 14 16 20 20 4 5 4 8 9 9 11 
CB 10 11 13 15 16 17 18 5 4 4 9 9 8 11 
SS 9 10 11 13 14 16 16 4 5 4 8 9 8 11 
PSIH 6 6 - 10 - - - 2 4 - 6 - - - 
SSIH 5 6 - 7 - - - 6 6 - 6 - - - 
4 
PS 5 7 9 11 12 12 13 5 5 6 11 9 9 12 
CB 6 6 8 13 16 18 18 6 6 5 9 9 11 12 
SS 6 8 9 14 16 17 20 6 5 6 11 11 9 12 
PSIH 5 6 - 8 - - - 4 4 - 5 - - - 
SSIH 6 7 - 11 - - - 4 5 - 5 - - - 
4 
PS 7 8 12 12 12 17 18 5 6 6 10 11 11 12 
CB 15 16 17 18 19 19 20 6 5 6 10 11 11 12 
SSIH 10 10 - - - - - 7 8 - 9 - - - 
SS 5 10 14 15 17 18 19 5 6 5 11 11 11 12 
5 
PS 5 10 12 12 13 16 18 2 3 2 5 5 4 7 
CB 5 6 8 10 10 11 13 2 2 2 4 4 4 7 
SS 6 7 8 11 13 14 14 2 3 2 5 4 4 7 
  
5 
PS 11 12 12 18 19 20 20 7 7 7 11 13 13 16 
CB 7 8 11 12 13 13 20 7 8 7 11 13 11 16 
SS 9 11 11 11 14 14 16 8 7 8 11 11 13 16 
PSIH 9 10 - 15 - - - 9 8 - 9 - - - 
SSIH 10 10 - 16 - - - 7 8 - 9 - - - 
6 
PS 7 9 9 13 16 16 16 7 9 9 11 11 12 14 
CB 9 9 9 11 11 12 14 9 7 9 11 11 11 14 
SS 10 10 11 14 15 15 17 7 9 7 12 12 12 14 
PSIH 6 9 - 10 - - - 2 6 - 12 - - - 
SSIH 7 7 - 10 - - - 12 12 - 12 - - - 
6 
PS 5 5 6 7 10 14 14 3 4 4 7 7 8 10 
CB 5 10 10 13 14 18 19 4 3 4 7 7 7 10 
SS 5 10 10 11 12 13 18 3 4 3 8 8 8 10 
7 
PS 7 8 10 15 15 16 17 6 6 5 13 14 15 16 
CB 9 10 10 12 15 15 16 6 5 5 12 10 10 16 
SS 5 6 6 7 11 13 16 5 6 6 7 10 12 16 
PSIH 6 10 - 14 - - - 2 2 - 3 - - - 
SSIH 5 7 - 9 - - - 2 3 - 3 - - - 
7 
PS 5 5 9 10 11 12 17 3 5 5 7 9 9 10 
CB 9 11 11 12 14 17 17 5 5 3 9 9 7 10 
SS 8 9 11 13 14 16 20 3 3 5 7 7 7 10 
PSIH 10 10 - 13 - - - 5 6 - 6 - - - 
SSIH 6 7 - 10 - - - 5 5 - 6 - - - 
7 
PS 13 14 14 17 17 19 19 9 9 9 12 12 12 16 
CB 9 9 15 15 15 16 19 9 9 6 12 12 9 16 
SS 6 6 9 9 12 15 16 6 6 9 9 12 12 16 
8 
PS 5 5 - 8 - - - 1 2 - 3 - - - 
SS 6 8 - 9 - - - 3 3 - 3 - - - 
8 
PS 5 7 - 9 - - - 3 2 - 3 - - - 
SS 5 5 - 8 - - - 2 3 - 3 - - - 
9 
PS 6 6 - 10 - - - 6 6 - 6 - - - 
SS 6 9 - 10 - - - 6 3 - 9 - - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the bid values for each block bundles, the experiment is run. VCG payment and profit for each 
block agent at UCE, revenue, and allocation to block agents at CE are determined and presented in 
Table 12. 
  
Table 12: Allocation of blocks, VCG payment to experimenter, and profit after redemption in 
desired experiment 
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Agent 
Bundle 
allocation 
(TEU) 
VCG 
(Rs) 
Profit(Rs)  
(Redemption 
value – VCG) 
1 
12,12,9 
UCE = 12 
6,6,6 
CE = 6 
PS 12 0 6 
SS 12 3 9 
1 
4,4,4 
UCE = 4 
4,4,4 
CE = 4 
PS 12 0 10 
SS 12 0 7 
2 
5,5,4 
UCE = 5 
5,5,4 
CE = 5 
PS 16 0 10 
SS 16 1 5 
2 
8,8,7 
UCE = 8 
8,8,7 
CE = 8 
PS 16 0 7 
SS 16 1 7 
3 
6,5,5,6 
UCE = 5 
5,5,5,5 
CE = 5 
PS 12 1 4 
CB 12 1 7 
SS 12 0 9 
3,3,3 
UCE =3 
3,3,3 
CE =3 
PSIH 6 0 7 
SSIH 6 0 5 
3 
5,5,5,5 
UCE = 5 
5,5,5,5 
CE = 5 
PS 16 0 6 
CB 16 0 5 
SS 16 0 5 
4 
6,6,6,6 
UCE = 6 
6,6,6,6 
CE = 6 
PS 8 0 12 
CB 8 0 11 
SS 8 0 9 
8,8,6 
UCE =8 
4,4,4 
CE = 4 
PSIH 4 0 6 
SSIH 4 2 4 
4 
8,8,8,8 
UCE = 8 
8,8,8,8 
CE = 8 
PS 4 0 5 
CB 4 0 8 
SS 4 0 8 
5,5,5,5 
UCE = 5 
5,5,5,5 
CE = 5 
PSIH 2 0 5 
SSIH 2 0 7 
4 
9,9,8,8 
UCE = 5 
9,9,8,8 
CE = 5 
PS 16 0 7 
CB 16 1 15 
SSIH - - - 
SS 16 1 13 
5 
3,3,3,3 
UCE = 3 
3,3,3,3 
CE = 3 
PS 16 0 12 
CB 16 0 6 
SS 16 0 6 
5 
12,12,12,12 
UCE = 12 
12,12,12,12 
CE = 12 
PS 12 0 12 
CB 12 0 7 
SS 12 0 11 
9,9,8 9,9,8 PSIH 6 0 9 
  
UCE = 9 CE = 9 SSIH 6 1 9 
6 
15,15,15,15 
UCE = 15 
15,15,15,15 
CE = 15 
PS 12 0 9 
CB 12 0 9 
SS 12 0 10 
4,4,4 
UCE = 4 
4,4,4 
CE = 4 
PSIH 6 0 6 
SSIH 6 0 7 
6 
5,5,5,5 
UCE = 5 
5,5,5,5 
CE = 5 
PS 10 0 5 
CB 28 0 10 
SS 10 0 10 
7 
9,9,8,8 
UCE = 9 
9,9,8,8 
CE = 9 
PS 4 0 10 
CB 4 1 9 
SS 4 1 4 
3,3,3 
UCE = 3 
3,3,3 
CE = 3 
PSIH 2 0 6 
SSIH 2 0 7 
7 
5,5,5,5 
UCE = 5 
5,5,5,5 
CE = 5 
PS 8 0 5 
CB 8 0 11 
SS 8 0 9 
6,6,6 
UCE = 6 
6,6,6 
CE = 6 
PSIH 4 0 10 
SSIH 4 0 6 
7 
15,15,15,15 
UCE = 15 
15,15,15,15 
CE = 15 
PS 16 0 14 
CB 16 0 15 
SS 16 0 6 
8 
2,2,2 
UCE = 2 
2,2,2 
CE = 2 
PS 16 0 5 
SS 16 0 8 
8 
2,1,1 
UCE = 2 
2,1,1 
CE = 2 
PS 20 1 4 
SS 20 1 4 
9 
6,6,6 
UCE = 6 
6,6,6 
CE = 6 
PS 12 0 6 
SS 12 0 9 
 
The total profit of block agents from all experiments in Stage 2 is provided in Table 13, and the 
allocation to the blocks are presented in Table 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Total profit earned by the block agent 
Agent 
type 
Port side 
agent (PS) 
Port side inter-
hatch agent 
(PSIH) 
Central block 
agent (CB) 
Starboard side inter-
hatch agent (SSIH) 
Starboard side 
agent (SS) 
  
Profit 
(Rs) 
159 49 113 45 159 
 
Table 14: Allocation of containers to blocks 
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Block type 
PS PSIH CB SSIH SS 
24 1 3 20 AD 332 1 01,03 2 12    12 
24 1 3 20 UD 361 1 01,03 2 12    12 
26 & 6 2 2 & 3 20 UD 241 1 05,07 2 16    16 
32 2 2 20 AD 242 1 05,07 2 16    16 
48 3 2 20 AD 242 1 09,11 5 12 6 12 6 12 
48 3 3 40 UD 311 1 10 3 16  16  16 
32 4 1 20 AD 132 2 13,15 5 8 4 8 4 8 
16 4 1 20 AD 132 2 13,15 5 4 2 4 2 4 
48 4 3 40 UD 361 2 14 3 16  16  16 
48 5 1 40 UD 111 2 18 3 16  16  16 
48 5 1 20 AD 112 2 17,19 5 12 6 12 6 12 
48 6 1 20 AD 122 2 21,23 5 12 6 12 6 12 
34 & 14 6 2 & 3 40 UD 
211 & 
351 
2 22 3 10  28  10 
16 7 1 20 AD 142 3 25,27 5 4 2 4 2 4 
32 7 1 20 AD 142 3 25,27 5 8 4 8 4 8 
48 7 2 20 UD 221 3 25,27 3 16  16  16 
25 & 7 8 1 & 3 20 AD 
152 & 
321 
3 29,31 2 16    16 
31 & 9 8 2 & 3 20 UD 
231 & 
321 
3 29,31 2 20    20 
24 9 3 20 AD 342 3 33,35 2 12    12 
 
From the output in Table 14, it is observed that there are conflicts in arranging the container in cells of 
the block to avoid rehandles. Hence, the conflicting hatches (2, 6, and 8) are identified, and Stage 3 is 
initiated to allocate containers in tiers. 
5.2.3. Stage 3 - Tier allocation in blocks 
Agents are informed by IES to demand containers in top or bottom tiers satisfy the structural and 
operational constraints. The redemption values are set by the experimenter, the bid values are submitted 
by agents for each experiment, and the desired output is selected after “Ne” experiments. The 
redemption and bid value for the tier allocation is shown in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Redemption value set by experimenter and bid value of agents for Tier allocation 
Block 
location 
Hatch 
Bay 
number 
Destination 
Tier 
agents 
Bundle 
formation 
Redemption 
value 
Bid value 
  
{1} {2} {12} {1} {2} {12} {1} {2} {12} 
PS 2 7 
2 Top 5 3 8 4 4 6 2 2 2 
3 Bottom 5 3 8 3 6 7 2 3 3 
SS 2 7 
2 Top 5 3 8 3 7 8 3 3 4 
3 Bottom 5 3 8 5 5 10 3 4 4 
CB 6 22 
2 Top 14 14 28 3 4 8 4 4 4 
3 Bottom 14 14 28 5 5 8 3 4 4 
PS 8 29 UD 
2 Top 9 1 10 5 6 9 4 5 5 
3 Bottom 9 1 10 5 6 10 5 4 5 
SS 8 29 UD 
2 Top 9 1 10 6 7 9 7 7 8 
3 Bottom 9 1 10 6 8 8 7 8 8 
PS 8 31 UD 
2 Top 6 4 10 7 8 9 2 1 2 
3 Bottom 6 4 10 4 5 9 1 1 2 
SS 8 31 UD 
2 Top 7 3 10 2 3 5 5 5 5 
3 Bottom 7 3 10 7 9 10 4 5 5 
 
The tier allocation at CE, VCG payment, and tier agent profit at UCE of the desired output in an 
experiment are presented in Table 16. 
Table 16: Tier allocation, VCG payment, and profit after redemption in desired experiment 
Block 
allocation 
Hatch 
Bay 
number 
Destination 
Tier 
agents 
Bundle allocation 
UCE 
(Rs) 
CE 
(Rs) 
VC
G 
(Rs) 
Profit 
(Rs) {1} {2} {12} 
PS 2 7 
2 Top 5 - - 2,1,2 2,1,2 1 3 
3 Bottom - 3 - 
UCE 
= 2 
CE = 
2 
0 6 
SS 2 7 
2 Top 5 - - 4,4,4 4,4,4 0 3 
3 Bottom - 3 - 
UCE 
= 4 
CE = 
4 
0 5 
CB 6 22 
2 Top 14 - - 2,1,2 2,1,2 1 2 
3 Bottom - 14 - 
UCE 
= 2 
CE = 
2 
0 5 
PS 8 29 UD 
2 Top 9 - - 2,1,1 2,1,1 1 4 
3 Bottom - 1 - 
UCE 
= 2 
CE = 
2 
1 5 
SS 8 29 UD 
2 Top 9 - - 8,8,8 8,8,8 0 6 
3 Bottom - 1 - 
UCE 
= 8 
CE = 
8 
0 8 
PS 8 31 UD 
2 Top 6 - - 2,2,1 2,2,1 0 7 
3 Bottom - 4 - 
UCE 
= 2 
CE = 
2 
1 4 
SS 8 31 UD 
2 Top 7 - - 2,1,2 2,1,2 1 1 
3 Bottom - 3 - 
UCE 
= 2 
CE = 
2 
0 8 
The total profit earned in Stage 3 by the tier agents after redeeming its allocation to the experimenter 
are calculated and presented in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Overall profits of tier agents 
Agent type Top tier agent Bottom tier agent 
Profit (Rs) 26 41 
 
  
6. Results and comparison 
The results obtained from the MAS methodology with an ICA mechanism for MBPP are discussed in 
this section. The sample bay plan obtained for a particular hatch designated by bay number, row number, 
and tier number to identify the location of the container with port of origin and destination in a ship is 
presented in Figure 7.  
    Hatch No.2    
    Bay No.5    
Row             
Tire 
08 06 04 02 01 03 05 07 
84 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
82 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
    Hatch Plate    
         
10   Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
  
08   Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
  
06   Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
  
04    Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
   
02    Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
   
    
Bay No.7 
   
Row             
Tire 
08 06 04 02 01 03 05 07 
84 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
82 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
    Hatch plate    
         
10   Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
  
08   Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
  
06   Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
Busan/Kaoh 
12T 2210 
Busan/Kaoh 
12T 2210 
Busan/Keel 
12T 2210 
  
04    Busan/Kaoh 
12T 2210 
Busan/Kaoh 
12T 2210 
   
02    Busan/Kaoh 
12T 2210 
Busan/Kaoh 
12T 2210 
   
 
Figure 7: Sample bay plan obtained using MAS approach for hatch 2 
 
The sample bay plan shows the arrangement of containers at port Busan after resolving the rehandling 
conflicts of the containers to the ports of destination Kaoh and Keel. The 2210 marked on the containers 
represents that two 20-foot end- and side-opening containers with passive vents on top of external height 
  
8 feet 6 inches can be placed, while 4210 represent a single 40-foot container of the same type. 12T and 
20T marked on the container in a bay plan represent the weight in tonnage of each container loaded on 
the ship. The total loading time, crane movement time, crane loading time, and order in allocating the 
hatches for ship stability are presented in Table 18. 
Table 18: Ship turnaround time calculation 
Hatch no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Order of loading hatches 8 6 7 3 1 2 4 5 9 
Loading time in 
hours:minutes:seconds 
0
:2
7
:4
6
 
0
:3
5
:5
8
 
0
:5
4
:0
2
 
0
:5
4
:0
2
 
0
:5
4
:0
2
 
0
:5
4
:0
2
 
0
:5
4
:0
2
 
0
:4
2
:5
8
 
0
:1
3
:0
6
 
Crane loading time in 
hours:minutes:seconds 
1:57:46 2:42:06 1:50:06 
Crane movement time in 
hours:minutes:seconds 
0:02:10 0:04:20 0:02:35 
Total loading time in 
hours:minutes:seconds 
1:59:56 2:46:26 1:52:41 
Ship turnaround time (tL) 
considering only the loading 
time 
6 hours 39 minutes 03 seconds 
 
Thus, the MBPP is solved using the MAS methodology by sharing the information through IES in terms 
of bid price regarding the container loading and stability constraints. The container loading time for a 
688 TEU container ship is obtained and found comparable to the benchmark problem. Also, the entire 
bay plan of containership (688 TEU) is prepared and found similar to the bay plan of the benchmark 
problem. Moreover, the computation time for an auction experiment in MAS methodology is observed 
to be less than a fraction of a second with an Intel core i5 processor with 3.06 GHz,  compared to 90 
minutes taken by the heuristic approach of the benchmark problem to solve the MBPP. Further, the 
MAS methodology promoted sustainability by communicating true information among stowage 
planners. Even though the solutions are sustainable, the results depend on the bidder’s ability to value 
the bundles in experiments. Moreover, the developed complete enumerative logical search algorithm 
suffers from computational and algorithmic complexity. The maximum computational complexity is 
NB * (BS-1) * m, if all the bidders bid for all bundled bid sets (BS = 2m) formed from m identical goods. 
The conclusion with the future research scope of MAS methodology is presented in next section.  
7. Conclusion and future work 
The arrangement of containers in the logistics chain is critical to provide the speedy delivery of 
resources from the area of supply to demand. In container logistics, it is necessary to gather the 
information on constraints in both ship and terminal to minimize the handling time of the containers. 
As the constraints on ship are critical in determining the efficiency of the container ship’s trade, the 
MBPP needs a well designed, automated, effective heuristic methodology to be solved. Our paper 
contributes by designing a MAS with an ICA mechanism to provide information exchange on the 
constraints of the MBPP. Further, in ICA, to promote active participation of agents and truth revelation 
  
in IES, efficient CE allocation, and incentive-compatible payment rules like VCG are used. To evaluate 
the designed MAS methodology, market experiments with continuous clearing and CE pricing policy 
are conducted by IES to allow agents to communicate by bidding. Software developed to determine the 
allocation and payment in ICA are used by IES for successful implementation of MAS. Allocations at 
CE price in ICA are obtained, and the VCG payments for agents winning the allocation at UCE price 
are determined for the experiment. Similar experiments are conducted to allocate all the bundled slots 
to the ship, and the experimental results are consolidated to prepare the master bay plan. The quality of 
the solution (bay plan of the entire ship) is verified and found acceptable for the benchmark problem. 
Thus the information regarding the constraints in MBPP is effectively handled to obtain sustainable 
solutions using MAS methodology. The paper initiates the application of MAS methodology to solve 
MBPP, and provides scope for future studies on its limitations. It includes: 
 Development of bundling procedure to combine a variety of heterogeneous non-identical goods for 
ICA. 
 Need of agent to learn algorithm to assist the bidders to value the bundled sets in ICA. 
 Development in complete enumerative logical search algorithm to validate ICA with more than 
three bidders and bundles. 
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Appendix 1. Example to calculate the VCG payment in combinatorial auction. 
Suppose there are three bidders {1, 2, 3} and two goods {1, 2}. The possible combination of goods to 
form bundles are {∅}, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}. The valuation profile by bidders are assumed and presented in 
Table A.1.  
Table A1.1: Bidders’ valuation of bundled goods 
Bundle 
sets 
Bid values (Rs) 
Bidder 
1 
Bidder 
2 
Bidder 
3 
 
0 0 0 
{1} 2 0 0 
{2} 0 4 2 
{12} 2 4 4 
The VCG payments at UCE in ICA based on the bidders’ valuation profile is calculated using the 
relation: 
VCG payment by bidder 1 = {Bid value of allocated bundle to bidder 1} – {Difference between the 
experimenter revenue in markets with all bidders and by excluding bidder 1}.  
Similarly, the VCG payments for all the bidders are obtained. The calculations for markets with all 
bidders and the externality of bidders are presented in Table A.2. 
Table A1.2: VCG payment for bidders 
Market 
participants 
Allocation obtained 
from winner 
determination 
algorithm 
Bid values 
for allocated 
bundles in 
ICA 
Experimenter 
(IES) revenue 
(Rs) 
VCG payment (Rs) 
Bidder Bundle set Bid value 
Bidders 1, 2 
and 3 
1 {1} 2 (X) 
2 + 4 = 6 (A) Not applicable 
2 {2} 4 (Y) 
Bidder 2 and 
3  
3 {1,2} 4 4 (B) 
Bidder 
1 
X – (A – 
B) =2–(6-
4) = 0 
Bidder 1 and 
3 
1 {1} 2 
2 + 2 = 4(C) 
Bidder 
2 
Y – (A - 
C) = 4-(6-
4) = 2 3 {2} 2 
Bidder 1 and 
2 
1 {1} 2 
2 + 4 = 6 (D) 
Bidder 
3 
0 – (A-D)   
=0-(6-6) 
=0 2 {2} 4 
 
  
  
Appendix 2. Redemption values and bid values for an experiment 
Table A2.1: Redemption value of experimenter and bid value by crane agents for hatch 
allocation 
Round Step 
Redemption value of experimenter (Rs) Bid values from the agent in experiment (Rs) 
Bundle 
sets {
0
} 
{1
} 
{2
} 
{3
} 
{1
2
} 
{1
3
} 
{2
3
} 
{1
2
3
} 
{0
} 
{1
} 
{2
} 
{3
} 
{1
2
} 
{1
3
} 
{2
3
} 
{1
2
3
} 
1 
1 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 3 5 5 7 10 11 13 0 3 5 5 5 6 7 11 
2 0 1 1 3 3 10 12 12 0 1 1 3 3 5 9 9 
3 0 3 3 3 4 9 18 19 0 1 1 1 4 7 16 18 
2 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 2 6 13 20 20 23 24 0 1 1 5 15 15 21 23 
2 0 1 2 8 10 11 15 15 0 1 1 1 5 7 15 15 
3 0 5 6 7 7 12 12 14 0 3 5 6 6 9 9 13 
3 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 3 10 10 12 13 14 15 0 3 5 5 9 11 13 15 
2 0 3 7 8 8 12 14 14 0 2 2 3 5 6 12 12 
3 0 4 10 10 11 13 13 15 0 1 5 5 7 11 11 15 
4 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 7 9 11 12 13 13 13 0 4 5 5 7 8 9 10 
2 0 4 5 6 6 8 8 9 0 3 3 3 6 6 9 9 
3 0 5 6 7 10 11 16 16 0 4 3 3 6 6 9 9 
5 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 5 5 15 10 20 20 25 0 5 5 15 10 20 20 25 
1 0 1 4 5 7 8 11 15 0 1 1 1 5 6 7 14 
2 0 1 3 5 7 13 15 15 0 1 3 5 6 11 15 15 
3 0 1 10 10 10 11 15 17 0 1 2 10 10 10 10 14 
2 1 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 5 8 9 9 9 14 14 0 1 3 3 3 5 13 13 
2 0 1 5 7 8 9 10 10 0 1 4 5 6 8 10 10 
3 0 2 2 6 7 8 9 10 0 2 2 2 4 6 8 10 
3 1 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 4 8 8 9 11 11 12 0 1 1 1 3 7 7 9 
  
2 0 2 4 5 6 7 7 9 0 2 2 2 4 4 5 8 
3 0 2 2 5 8 9 11 13 0 2 2 2 3 5 7 11 
2 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 3 3 5 11 12 12 15 0 3 3 5 7 9 9 15 
2 0 2 4 11 11 12 14 15 0 2 2 2 4 4 8 10 
3 0 1 3 4 8 12 12 15 0 1 1 1 3 9 9 15 
3 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 1 3 6 8 8 9 9 0 1 2 2 6 6 8 8 
2 0 1 6 7 8 11 11 14 0 1 1 3 6 7 7 8 
3 0 1 3 5 8 9 9 9 0 1 2 5 6 8 8 8 
4 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 11 15 15 26 26 30 41 0 11 15 15 26 26 30 41 
1 0 2 4 13 15 15 16 18 0 2 2 2 5 7 9 12 
2 0 2 3 9 10 11 12 15 0 3 3 3 4 5 7 14 
3 0 2 4 13 15 16 17 18 0 3 2 3 5 8 10 16 
4 1 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 12 12 11 24 23 23 35 0 12 12 11 24 23 23 35 
1 0 1 4 3 10 11 14 15 0 1 1 3 5 7 13 14 
2 0 1 1 2 4 5 10 10 0 1 1 1 2 4 9 10 
3 0 2 3 6 3 6 7 15 0 2 2 3 3 5 5 9 
5 
1 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 2 3 7 7 9 11 11 0 2 3 3 6 6 7 7 
2 0 4 5 8 8 9 9 11 0 1 3 4 5 5 5 8 
3 0 2 2 5 7 8 8 10 0 1 2 4 5 6 6 10 
2 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 6 12 22 23 25 28 28 0 6 6 14 16 20 26 26 
2 0 7 9 10 12 12 15 15 0 3 5 6 9 9 15 15 
3 0 7 12 15 20 22 24 25 0 3 5 11 15 19 23 25 
6 
1 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 3 5 5 8 8 10 13 0 3 5 5 8 8 10 13 
1 0 2 4 7 7 9 9 12 0 1 2 3 3 6 6 7 
2 0 1 3 4 5 5 7 9 0 1 2 2 4 5 5 8 
3 0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 0 1 2 2 2 4 5 6 
2 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 2 2 2 4 5 6 8 
  
2 0 1 2 2 5 6 10 10 0 1 2 2 3 5 5 5 
3 0 2 4 4 4 9 10 10 0 2 3 3 3 8 8 8 
3 
Bundle 
Size 
(TEU) 
Crane 
Agent No 
0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 0 16 16 16 32 32 32 48 
1 0 4 4 5 6 6 9 10 0 2 1 2 2 3 5 8 
2 0 2 2 3 5 6 6 8 0 2 2 2 2 2 6 7 
3 0 3 5 6 6 7 9 9 0 2 2 2 4 5 6 9 
 
